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Commercial Paper in Economic Theory
and Legal History
BY HAROLD R.

WEINBERG*

INTRODUCTION

Commercial -paper played a significant role in antebellum
America by partially filling the void resulting from the shortage
of gold and silver coinage and the absence of a reliable paper currency. Although most legal historians would agree with this
premise,' a controversy has arisen in recent years concerning negotiability, that collection of legal rules which greatly enhanced
the usefulness of bills of exchange and promissory notes in commerce and finance.
Many scholars believe that negotiability, along with other
pre-Civil War legal doctrines, was intended to facilitate the development of a national market system and economic growth.
This view typically holds that courts acted with the general approval of society and either ignores any major wealth redistributive consequences of these developments or assumes that such
2
consequences were unanticipated.
A very different view of the rise of commercial paper negotiability during 1780-1860 has been advanced by Morton Hor-

witz.3 In The Transformation of American Law he argues that
American judges developed negotiability primarily to protect
mercantile and entrepreneurial minorities that stood to gain
from an expanding market economy. 4 This was accomplished at
the expense of persons possessing a pre- or anti-commercial consciousness. The sweeping transformation described by Horwitz,

Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This paper is based
upon a formal comment given at the antebellum commercial law program held during the
1980 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History in Philadelphia, Pa. The
author would like to thank Tony Freyer and Richard Kilbourne for their suggestions and
Gerald Henderson for his research assistance.
1 See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERiCAN LAw 235-37 (1972).
2 See generallyBook Review, A Plot Too Doctrinaire,55 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1977).
3 M. Hohwrrz, THE TRANSFOIMATIO OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).

4 Id. at 212-26.
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which was also reflected in property, contract, and other areas of
law, was one in which enterprise was subsidized and protected
while farmers, workers, consumers, and less powerful groups
were increasingly disadvantaged.5
This controversy among legal historians bears an illuminating relationship to the work of other analysts who have sought to
employ economic tools to advance the understanding of legal
doctrine. Numerous studies of common law rules, including
many relating to the branches of law discussed by Horwitz, suggest that judge-made law can be understood "as if" it were the
product of judges who sought to maximize social wealth by utilizing a criterion of economic efficiency. 6 This conclusion is obviously at variance with the Horwitzian view of antebellum legal
history. It must also be unsatisfactory to historians whose training does not permit them to be satisfied with "as if" explanations,
but which requires them to ask why common law rules approximate an efficient allocation of resources.
Analysts have begun to explore two lines of explanation for
the emergence of efficient case law. "Visible hand" theories postulate the existence of judges who sought to announce efficient
doctrine. 7 "Invisible hand" theories, on the other hand, do not
depend on judicial motivations. They hold, for example, that the
costs imposed by an inefficient rule create an incentive for litigants to expend resources in order to obtain the rule's modification or reversal. 8 Efficient legal doctrine might therefore have
evolved even if judges were indifferent to or biased against efficiency as a decisional criterion.
Parts I and II of this article seek to advance the inquiry into
the significance of commercial paper in legal history by presenting a positive economic analysis of some of the decision rules that
were important to commercial paper negotiability. 9 It is hoped
5 Id. at 253-54.
6 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
7 Id. atl 19.7. See also Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and Feckless

Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56
TuL. L. REv. 1 (1981).
8 See Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEc.
STUD. 397 (1981).
9 See generally Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTA L. REv.
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that this theory might be of use to historical studies of the allocative, distributive, or other characteristics of the judicially created
negotiability doctrine applied prior to the Civil War. The article's conclusion offers some suggestions concerning how this inquiry might be further advanced. It is also hoped that this analysis will have relevance to modern commercial paper law, much
of which closely resembles the rules applied by nineteenth century judges. 10
I.

COMMERCIAL PAPER AS A MONEY SUBSTITUTE

Money reduces the costs of market trading in two ways.
First, it functions as a medium of exchange. Goods can be exchanged for money and vice versa in multilateral transactions
whereas a moneyless society would be forced to rely on a system
of bilateral exchange, or barter. Furthermore, by functioning as
a medium of exchange money also makes possible efficiencies
through productive specialization. An individual's or firm's output of products or services can be exchanged for money which
can in turn be used to purchase any service or commodity available in the market. 12 In addition to its service as a medium of exchange, money functions as a store of value. It enables consumers
or firms to set aside income for future consumption or production. An inventory of money can be employed to bridge temporal
13
gaps between receipts and expenditures.
485 (1980) (concerning whether economic efficiency is a worthy and obtainable goal of socialpolicy).
10 Development of the law of commercial paper accelerated in England under Lord

Mansfield (1756-1788), and these developments were very influential in America. See G.
GILMOre, THE ACES OF AMERICAN LAW 24 (1977). Common law commercial paper doctrine continued to evolve in this country after 1860. For these reasons some of the authorities referred to herein precede or follow the period 1780-1860 by a few years. The law of
commercial paper as initially codified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (promulgated in 1896) and currently in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code bears the
strong imprint of the common law. See W. BhrrroN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BILus
AND NOTES 5-9 (2d ed. 1961).
11 j. HmsmEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APpLICATIONS § 8.D (1976). Money also functions as an accounting unit which can be employed to place values on assets or debts. Id.
12 Id, at § 6.A. See also 1 A. SMrrH, AN INQuiRy INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26-28 (1776) (Cannan ed. 1976).

13 An advantage of commercial paper during the antebellum period was that it was
less costly than metallic money to transfer or store. See Kilbourne, Antebellum Commer-
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Commercial paper consisted of private written contractual
instruments adapted to serve as money substitutes. The simplest
form of commercial paper employed during the antebellum
period was the promissory note wherein.a maker agreed to pay a
specified sum to a payee. 14 The sum might be payable on demand
or at some specified future date. Slightly more complex was the
bill of exchange, or draft. 15 By this instrument a drawer would
order a drawee to pay a specified amount to a payee. The
drawer's order bound him to pay if the drawee refused to honor
the bill. The drawee could contractually bind himself to honor
the bill through the act of acceptance which often consisted of
signing the instrument. In theory, though sometimes not in practice, the drawee would be holding funds for or otherwise be indebted to the drawer and hence would be willing to accept the
bill.16

Either form of commercial paper could and did serve as a
money substitute. For example, the payee of a promissory note
might transfer the paper to a merchant in payment for a purchase of goods. Actually, the use of commercial paper in antebellum commerce and finance was frequently much more elaborate
than this. The paper often passed through several sets of hands,
multiple parties became obligors on the paper, and various
agents, banks, and brokers became involved in the papers' handling, discounting, and collection. 17 However, the point fundamental to this discussion is that commercial paper was an acceptable money substitute because creditors, merchants, and others
were willing to do business in reliance upon individuals' and business firms' written promises of payment. With this in mind, we
can proceed with an economic analysis of the manner in which

cial Law: CivilLaw Approachesto Secured Transactions,70 Ky. L.J. (in print) (1981-82).
See generally Waterman, The Promissory Note as a Substitutefor Money, 14 MINN. L.
REv. 313 (1930).
14 See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (6th ed. Boston
1868) [hereinafted cited as STORY ON NOTES].
15 See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (2d. ed. Boston
1847) [hereinafter cited as STORY ON BI=S].
16 Id. at § 13. There might be no money debt owed by drawee to drawer in the'case
of an accommodation acceptance.
THE COMMERCIAL PAPER HOUSE IN THE UNITED STATES 3-37 (1938).
17 See A. G _EEF,
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various negotiability rules may have enhanced commercial paper
in its money substitute role.
For purposes of this analysis,.it is useful to view commercial
paper and negotiability from the perspective of risk and to recognize that, economically speaking, risk is a cost.' 8 A transferee
who acquires commercial paper in payment of a debt or for
goods or services confronts several classes of risks. For the moment, this article will focus on two of them: the insolvency risk
and the defense risk. 9 A simple example will help to illustrate the
significance of negotiability with respect to these risks. Suppose A
makes a promissory note for $300 payable to the order of B in one
month as payment for a shipment of lumber. After receiving possession of the note B indorses and transfers it to C in payment for
the current purchase of a wagon. C, in turn, indorses and transfers the note to pay D for a debt previously incurred.
D, to the extent that he is looking to A for payment, must be
concerned with the possibility that A will not have the $300
necessary to honor the note at the appointed time.20 Information
can help to counteract uncertainty concerning the risk of A's insolvency.21 D may seek to reduce his risk by purchasing reports
concerning A's financial reliabilityY. But the process of acquiring
information is costly in that it can require the expenditure of
money and time, both scarce resources. The doctrine of negotiability provided D with a less costly means to reduce the insolvency risk.

18 See P. LAYAIRD & A. WALTERS, MICRO-ECONOMIC THEORY 360-62 (1978).

19 There were many possible defenses including usury, legal incompetence, and ultra
vires. See STORY ON NOTES, supra note 14, at §§ 407-408(a). In addition, the paper in the
hands of a transferee might be subject to ownership claims.
20 The extent of his concern would be a function of his risk aversity (that is, the subjective positive or negative utility he derives from exposure to risk) plus the actuarial value
of the risk (probability times magnitude). See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at § 4.5. It is safe
to assume that many antebellum creditors were risk averse. See L. FRmDMAN, supra note
1, at 236-37.
21 See Hirshleffer, WhereAre We in the Theory of InformationP, 63 AM. EcoN. REv.
31(1973).
22 Given the demand for information concerning credit worthiness, it is not surprising that the antebellum market provided credit reporting services. See T. FREYER, FoRUMS
OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8 (1979). Expertise
in evaluating credit risks was important to the success of note brokers. See generally A.
GREEF, supranote 17, at 30-32.
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One important attribute of negotiable commercial paper was
that a person who signed as maker or ifidorser became bound to
honor the paper to subsequent transferees with whom he would
have no direct dealings.23 Thus, if the law considered the note in
the example to be negotiable, D would have rights against A, B,
and C. In effect, D holds a portfolio of promises over which the
risk of insolvency is diversified. 24 A might be robbed of all his
money and be unable to honor his promise, but it is less likely
that A, B, and C would have all suffered this misfortune.25 Diversification was less beneficial for reducing risks that were more
likely to affect A, B, and C's solvency simultaneously such as a financial panic.
The risk of defenses such as failure of consideration could be
similarly reduced through diversification so long as each party
was permitted to interpose only his own defenses and not those of
other parties.25 Therefore, the negotiability doctrine also reduced
the risk that A would assert a defense arising out of B's performance of the lumber contract. However, a second significant
consequence of negotiability provided particularly deserving
transferees with protection against many defenses that a maker
or indorser was entitled to assert against a mere contract assigneeY In order to receive this protection a transferee such as D
would have to be a holder of the note who acquired it in the

23 STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at §§ 107-08; STORY ON NOTES, supra note 14, at
§ § 128, 135. The law also provided transferees with warranty rights against their immediate prior transferors.
24 See generallyPOSNER, supranote 6, at § 15.1.
25 See A. SMITH, supra note 12, at 329.
Though the drawer, acceptor, and endorsers of the bill, should all of them,
be persons of doubtful credit; yet, still the shortness of the date gives some security to the owner of the bill. Though all of them may be very likely to become bankrupts, it is a chance if they all become so in so short a time. The
house is crazy, says a weary traveller to himself, and will not stand very
long; but it is a chance if it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to
sleep in it to-night.
Id.
2 In some situations a party could assert third party rights. See generally W. BaRITTON, supranote 10, at §§ 157-60.
27 STORY ON BILLS, supranote 15, at § 188; STORY ON NOTES, supranote 14, at § 191.
Transferees may not have received protection against certain defenses such as usury. See
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usual course of trade, for a valuable consideration, and without

notice of any defense or other infirmity.2 We may adopt Justice
Story's phraseology and call this protected class "bona fide
holders." Of course, bona fide holder status did not completely
eliminate the defense risk. A could always seek to assert defenses
against D by arguing, for example, that D was not a bona fide
holder or that the note was not negotiable.2 D would then have
to decide whether the cost of litigating these issues with A was
justified in light of the expected recovery and in light of the possibilities of enforcing the note against B or C.
While negotiability made the note more like money by reducing D's uncertainty concerning defenses, this gain may have
been offset by diseconomies resulting from the placement of the
risk of loss of defenses on A. Thus, it is necessary to also analyze
the relative efficiency of these persons as risk bearers. A would
clearly be the more efficient risk bearer to the extent that he had
control over whether he had a defense. For example, if the price
of the lumber was $300 plus one horse, A's intentional failure to
tender the horse could have caused B to refuse to deliver the lumber.-1 Assuming that A's defense was legitimate and not the result
of A's failure to perform his side of the contract, two additional
lines of inquiry are helpful in comparing A and D as risk bearers.
First, it is necessary to consider the respective risk prevention capabilities of each person. Second, it is also necessary to consider
31
their respective insurance capabilities.
Under a legal regime of negotiability, A would have a variety
of means to evaluate and reduce the possibility that a defense
might be cut off by a bona fide holder. A was in privity with B.

M. HORWiTZ, supra note 3, at 219-20. See also notes 37 & 103-04 infra and accompanying
text.
2 STORY ON BiLLs, supra note 15, at § 188; STORY ON NOTES, supra note 14, at § 191.
29 See note 45 infra and the accompanying text.
30
A disincentive against dishonest or opportunistic conduct would lie in the harm
that it could do to a commercial paper obligor's credit reputation. See note 22 supra and
H. DEMSETZ, ECONOMIc, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION 37-38
(1982).
31 See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at §§ 4.5, 6.2-.3.
32 This analysis assumes that the maker perceives the risk of cut off defenses. An inefficient allocation of resources can result if the maker is unaware of this cost when he signs
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This could help A evaluate the likelihood of B's nonperformance
prior to issuing the note.s This, along with information based on
general knowledge and prior experience concerning the possibility that a bona fide holder might seek to enforce the note, would
enable A to estimate the probability that his defenses would be
cut off. The product of this probability and three hundred dollars, the face amount of the note and a base approximation of the
magnitude of A's loss if he were deprived of defenses,3 would
provide a measure of the expected value of the risk.
Depending on the outcome of his evaluation of the likelihood
that a defense would arise and be cut off, A could obtain additional information concerning B, withhold the note until he received the lumber, or take other risk reductive steps. Each of
these measures would have attendant incremental costs which A
would have to balance against the incremental value of the risk
reduction purchased. Obtaining additional information about
B's potential performance might require expenditures of time
and money. The price for the lumber could be higher if B agreed
away the right to a predelivery payment by negotiable note, thus
foregoing the opportunity to immediately negotiate the note to C
in order to purchase the wagon. Transaction costs relating to
working out the terms of the lumber contract might be increased
to the extent that protective measures resulted in nonstandard
terms. A would be willing to purchase risk reduction up to the

the instrument. For a discussion of this source of inefficiency in a twentieth century context, see Geva, Optimalityand Preservationof Consumer Defenses-A Modelfor Reform,
31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 51, 54-63 (1980). The holder's perceptions are also important. A
transferee that charges a discount based on the assumption that he will be subject to any
defenses that may arise receives a windfall if it turns out that he is protected by negotiability doctrine.
33 As defense risk was not limited to the possibility that his defenses might be cut off
by a bona fide holder. It would also include, for example, the possibility that he would be
forced into litigation to establish a defense against a non-bona fide holder. A's risks relating to defenses would have been elements of the set of all risks relating to the contract. For
example, the risk that B's nonperformance would necessitate the purchase of substitute
lumber at a higher price. Means of risk reduction relating to defenses could help reduce
these other risks as well.
34 A's loss could exceed payment of $300 for lumber never received. He might have to
pay interest in order to borrow the money, or the payment might render him unable to
continue in business. B might not be equally liable for all these damages or might be insolvent. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). The loss might be less than
$300 if B's performance had some value to A.
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point that its marginal cost equaled its marginal benefit.
Information concerning the likelihood of B's nonperformance would also enhance A's capability to insure, perhaps by
paying a third party to guarantee B's performance under what
would amount to a contract of market insurance. As a less costly
alternative, A might pay a slightly lower price to each person
from whom he purchases goods and services, thereby spreading
the risk of loss of defenses through a form of self-insurance.
Under a legal regime of nonnegotiability, remote holders
such as D would seek to reduce the possibility of being subject to
defenses. Given the exigencies of antebellum communications
and transportation, D could be handicapped in this endeavor if A
and B were geographically distant.-" Thus, it may have been relatively costly for D to evaluate the probability of being subject to
defenses. Assuming that this risk could be evaluated, D might
avoid the risk by refusing to purchase the note. If D preferred not
to completely forego the opportunity to enforce the note, then he
might require that compensation for accepting the defense risk
be reflected in the discount. D would also have means to insure
against the risk. He might pay a third party to guarantee the
note. He might also self-insure by acquiring a portfolio of multiple instruments bearing the names of different obligors and,
thus, bearing different risks. D might also self-insure by increasing the discount charged to all transferors from whom he acquires commercial paper.In summary, placement of the risk of cut off defenses on A
and relieving D of the risk of being subject to defenses if he was a
bona fide holder may have been economically correct given the
probability of A's superior access to information concerning the
transaction which generated the note. This access would give A
an advantage in both preventing and insuring against his risk.
Any margin of superiority enjoyed by A would be reduced if the
analysis also reflects the possibility that D might diversify his
risks through multiple indorsements on A's note. This additional

35 See T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE ACE OF ENTERPRISE 56-59 (Rev. ed. 1961).
Of course, it also is possible thatA and B resided near or were otherwise well known to D.

36 The size of the discount would also have reflected other factors such as D's inability to obtain immediate payment under time notes.
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attribute of negotiability would have been particularly important to D if other means of self-insurance were less effective because he did not deal in commercial paper in volume.
Some obligors and bona fide holders may have been more or
less efficient than A and D with respect to preventing or insuring
against the risk of cut off defenses. Avoidance of the administrative costs and uncertainty of particularized inquiries might have
justified a rule that always permitted bona fide holders to cut off
defenses even if the rule led to inefficient results in occasional
cases. However, negotiability doctrine ultimately developed so as
to permit certain groups of commercially unsophisticated persons
to assert defenses against bona fide holders, perhaps because
these obligors did not enjoy an advantage in dealing with the defense risk.-" Bona fide holders were also subject to certain defenses such as that an instrument originated in a usurious transaction. The classes of defenses not cut off by bona fide holders,
sometimes called "real defenses," were narrowly defined and
probably less common and less easily trumped-up than the "personal defenses" such as failure of consideration and most types of
fraud that were cut off. Thus, the real defenses may not have significantly impaired the utility of commercial paper in its money
substitute role.
This analysis suggests how the requirements for bona fide
holder status served a risk-shifting function. Bona fide holders
were permitted to have generalized knowledge of the "defense
riskiness" of commercial paper. But this special status was not
available to a holder with knowledge of a particular defense at
the time he acquired the paper.3 Requirements of lack of knowledge, acquisition in the ordinary course of trade, and bona fides
shifted the defense risk from obligors to holders who could have
avoided a known defense risk by refusing to give value against
the paper but instead chose to take that risk on the theory that
the paper would prove to be more valuable than its cost.39 The
37 This development took place after mideentury when the importance of commercial paper's money substitute role had begun to diminish. See note 94 infra. Concerning
the defenses that could be successfully asserted against a bona fide holder, see generally
text accompanying notes 102-04 infra; W. BrrTON, supra note 10, at 125; M. HoRwrrz,
supranote 3, at 219.
38 See notes 41-42 infra and the accompanying text.
39 See R. POSNER. supranote 6, at § 6.6.
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decision to take the risk may have been based on an assessment
that the circumstances of acquisition were such that a court
would mistakenly hold that the acquisition met the requirements
for bona fide holder protection. It may
also have reflected a
41
gambling.
or
risk
for
preference
holder's
The optimal level of transferee risk prevention would have
reflected the severity of the standard of care created by these
bona fide holder requirements. Would-be bona fide holders
would have to take greater precautions if the standard ruled out
transfers that would have excited the suspicions of a prudent person than if it ruled out only those involving gross negligence in
failing to learn of a defense. 4' A lower standard of care, by narrowing the circumstances that could impugn bona fide holder
status, would have made commercial paper less risky and more
attractive as a money substitute. But it might also have reduced
transferees' incentives to exercise care in the acquisition of commercial paper and made the intentional purchase of questionable
paper more attractive. It comes as no surprise that issues such as
the appropriate standard of good faith for bona42fide holders were
of much concern during the antebellum period.
Having examined the positions of A and D, it is now appropriate to consider the situations of B and C, the intermediaries in
the chain of negotiation. It will be recalled that B received the
note directly from A in payment for lumber and then indorsed it
to C for the current purchase of a wagon. B was the payee and
dealt directly with A. It would not further the circulation of
commercial paper to permit B to take free of A's defenses and the
law did not afford B such protection.4 C, on the other hand, may
have been deserving of bona fide holder protection from the defense risk if he had sought to enforce A's contract. The reason C
40 See note 20 suprafor a discussion of risk aversity.
41 On the other hand, a higher standard for transferees may have reduced the opti-

mal level of precautions for commercialpaper obligors.
42 See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § 194; STORY ON NOTES, supra note 14, at §
197; 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 81-82. See also Rightmire, The Doctrine ofBad Faithin the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 18 MicH. L. REv. 355 (1920).

43 The courts did recognize, however, that there was reason to protect a person who
appeared to be the payee on the face of a note but who was actually a remote purchaser.

See Aigler, Payeesas Holders in Due Course, 36 YALE L.J. 608 (1927).
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deserves special attention is that he chose to indorse and transfer
the note, thereby taking on indorser liability to subsequent transferees.
C's indorsement risk resulted from the possibility that he
would be called upon by D to honor his indorser's contract if A
did not meet his obligation as a maker. This risk was reduced by
C's ability to look to B who had previously indorsed and to A on
his maker's contract. 44 Thus, negotiability doctrine not only
sought to relieve ultimate bona fide holders of the defense risk,
but also sought to move the indorsement risk up the chain of indorsements toward the payee. This would have been an efficient
rule to the extent of the probability that there was a direct relationship between the order of indorsement and each intermediate indorser's capability to evaluate the probability and magnitude of the risk that the maker might assert a defense. If B
honored his indorsement contract, then all subsequent transferees would be insulated from the unpleasantries between A and
B who would then bear most of the costs of their dispute.
A variety of other rules were also intended to enhance commercial paper in its antebellum medium of exchange role. Spare
form requirements, such as that bills or notes contain an unconditional order or promise to pay a sum certain in metallic money,
enabled transferees to quickly ascertain the terms of the promises
embodied in the paper. 45 Title to commercial paper could be
44 Holders could indorse "without recourse" if they wanted to avoid this risk. But
they may have remained liable to their immediate transferees on a breach of warranty
theory despite this form of indorsement. See Britton, The Liability of a Transferorby Delivery andA QualiftedIndorser,40 YALE L.J. 215 (1930).
The indorsement risk was also reduced by a set of rules which required holders to
initially seek payment from the maker or the drawee of a draft and to give prompt notice
to prior indorsers if such payment was not forthcoming as per the terms of the instrument.
See 2 J. DANIEL, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF NEcOTLALE INSTRuMENTS ch. XXIX (3rd ed.
1882). These rules may have been efficient because possession of the instrument provided a
holder such as D with two important advantages over prior indorsers. First, the instrument would have specified the amount, time, place and other details relating to payment.
Second, physical presentment of the instrument was normally required to obtain payment
and promptness in obtaining payment would tend to reduce the insolvency risk and perhaps other risks as well. See id. at ch. XLVI; I id. at XVII-XX. It was well understood that
the insolvency risk increased with the passage of time. See note 25 supra.
45 See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § § 32-69; STORY ON NOTES. supranote 14, at
§§ 8-59. Chattel notes payable, for example, in hay or hogs, were denied negotiable status
because of their nonstandard nature. L. FRIEDMAN, supranote 1, at 236.
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passed merely by delivery or delivery with the indorsement of the
transferor. 48 Holders who brought suit on commercial paper enjoyed certain procedural advantages denied to mere contract assignees. 47 The "shelter" doctrine provided that a bona fide holder
could transfer his right to take free of defenses to his immediate
transferee even if the transferee could not qualify for bona fide
holder status in his own right.48 Thus, the law of negotiability
49
served to make each bill and note "a courier without luggage."
Finally, one can observe that if it was the pervasive importance of commercial paper as a medium of exchange that supported antebellum negotiability doctrine, the application of this
doctrine might be questioned by a judge when it appeared that
the paper in question had not served such a function. For
example, the troublesome question of whether pledgees of commercial paper given to secure an antecedent debt had given the
requisite value for bona fide holder status may have reflected a
judicial perception that pledged paper was less like coinage circulating from hand to hand in commerce and more like a silver
cup or a keg of whiskey given as collateral.so Such personalty
represented a store of value, but did not circulate widely as an
exchange medium. The issue of whether taking commercial
paper in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt constituted receiving
value may have fallen somewhere between the case of a pledge
and the case described in the example in which C received the
note in current payment for a wagon. 5' The paper's store of value

48 See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15 at S 109; STORY ON NoTES, supra note 14, at §

43.

47

See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at §§ 178, 193; STORY ON NOTES, supra note

14, at §§ 181, 196.
48 See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § 189; STORY ON Noms. supra note 14, at §

191.
49 Overton v. Tyler, 3"Pa. 346, 347 (1846). The law of negotiable instruments also
benefitted the obligor. For example, payment to a holder discharged the instrument and
the underlying obligation. Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV.441,450 (1979).

O This was an important issue. See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § 191; STORY
ON NOTES,supra note 14, at § 195. Concerning pledges, see generally 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 1.1, 1.3 (1965) which includes antebellum
references.
51 See STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § 192; STORY ON NOTES, supra note 14, at §
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function may have been highlighted and its medium of exchange
function less apparent, particularly if the holder-creditor
planned to require payment on the note rather than to renegotiate it. Of course, metallic money would have been at least as
acceptable to a creditor in search of security for or payment of an
antecedent debt and would certainly have not ceased to be
viewed as money in the creditor's hands. Commercial paper may
have been properly viewed in the same light by courts holding
that antecedent creditors receiving commercial paper gave value
in these situations.5 2
II.

NEGOTIABILITY AND WRONGDOING

Thus far this analysis has largely ignored the possibility that
commercial paper was sometimes employed in fraudulent or
other socially disapproved activities.- However, it has been suggested that the species of commercial paper referred to as "accommodation paper" was sometimes judicially perceived as
tainted and that this may have been a factor in the formulation
of case law involving negotiability.4 It is therefore appropriate,
in conjunction with our earlier discussion of possible diseconomies resulting from negotiability, to analyze whether forms of
wrongdoing associated with accommodation paper or other
criminal or tortious conduct were exacerbated by the development of negotiability.s
Initially, it is necessary to recognize that accommodation
paper can be divided into three distinct subcategories, each of
which was common in American commerce and finance prior to
the Civil War.ys One type bore the signature of an accommoda-

.52
See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1842).
5 We have seen a relationship between negotiability doctrine and gambling. See the
accompanying text at note 40 supra. Antebellum judges were concerned with speculation
in commercial paper. See M. HORWiTZ, supranote 3, at 216.
54 For a discussion of judicial attitudes toward the negotiability of accommodation

paper, see Freyer, Antebellum CommericalLaw: Common Law Approaches to Secured
Transactions,70 Ky. L.J. (No. 2) (1981-82).

Concerning the costs of various forms of wrongdoing, see Becker, Crime andPunishment: An EconomicApproach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,179-80 (1968).
v See generally T. FREYER, supra note 22, at 10-11; R. KILBOURNE, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 137-38 (1980); H. Knoos & C. GILBERT, AMER-
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tion party who was actually a surety. The surety would lend his
signature in order to enhance the attractiveness of a bill of exchange or note to potential transferees. In our example above, A
would have been an accommodation maker if he issued the note
to B not in payment for lumber, but solely to enable B to purchase the wagon from C. Accommodation parties also signed as
drawers, acceptors, and indorsers. A second type of accommodation paper was commercial paper issued for a pre-existing debt.57
A pre-existing debt was involved in the case of the renewal notes
executed in conjunction with medium or long term loans. The
debtor issued successive short term renewal notes with the understanding that the debt would be extended upon each note's maturity. Antebellum commercial usage was such that a note issued
to evidence a prior debt might also carry the signature of a
surety-type accommodation party.5 The accommodation label
was also applied to a third type of commercial paper that was actually nothing more than written evidence of accounts receivable. In our example, A's note given in payment for the lumber
could have fallen into this category.
Accommodation paper of the surety type may have been accurately perceived as sometimes being employed as an instrument of fraud. Accommodation signatures, which were certainly placed on notes to induce third party reliance, often did not
evidence actual obligations and may have sometimes been made
without any intent to ever honor the paper. Accommodation
paper of the pre-existing debt type may have been the subject of
judicial disapproval because it did not issue for a current obligation and, perhaps, because of a bias against long-term borrowing.
All types of accommodation paper were difficult to distin-

ICAN BusNEss HiSTORY 111-14 (1972); F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMEmCAN BANKING

11-12,44-45(1968).
57 The negotiability of such paper presents an issue which is distinct from that of
whether a transferee who took commercial paper in satisfaction of an antecedent debt
gave sufficient value to be a bona fide holder. The latter issue is discussed at notes 50-52
supra and accompanying text.
,8 See, e.g., Bank of Montgomery County v. Walker, 9 Serg. & Rawle 229 (Pa.

1823).
59 See T. FREYEn, supra note 22, at 10-11; Freyer, supra note 54.
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guish on their face from nonaccommodation paper. 6 A legal rule
that interfered with the full negotiability of any type of accommodation paper would have necessarily increased the riskiness of
all commercial paper transactions. Thus, the importance of commercial paper as a medium of exchange was often given as a sufficient rationale for permitting bona fide holders to enforce accommodation paper in the same manner as any other commercial paper.6 ' An economic analysis of the relationship between
negotiability and the disapproved practices associated with accommodation paper suggests that such a rule would not have re62
sulted in important diseconomies.
A decision rule impairing the negotiability of any type of
commercial paper would have to be justified in light of the fact
that the paper may have been issued as part of a consensual commercial or financial transaction which the participants viewed as
mutually beneficial and value enhancing and which was free
from tortious or criminal motivations. An individual might lend
his name as an accommodation in anticipation of a hoped for future benefit. A financing arrangement involving renewal notes
could enable the debtor to purchase an expensive capital good,
such as a ship, and allow the creditor to earn a profit. Accounts
receivable type accommodation paper enabled sellers and capital
poor buyers to enter into credit sales. Further analysis illustrates
the ambiguous and sometimes inefficient results of limiting negotiability in order to deal with the abuses associated with accommodation paper. Surety-type accommodation paper is used in
the discussion because of the concrete nature of the fraud in
which it was sometimes employed.

60 Commercial paper brokers may have sought to distinguish accommodation from
nonaccommodation paper. R. KILBOURNE, supra note 56, at 137 n.65.
61 The paper could be legally enforced even if the holder knew that it bore a suretytype accommodation. See Grant and Cary v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227 (1831). See generally
J. KENT,supra note 42, at 86; STORY ON BILLS, supra note 15, at § 190; STORY ON NOTES,
supra note 14, at § 194.
62 It is possible that surety-type accommodation paper was troublesome because of a
belief that it was unfair for accommodation parties to have to honor their contract or because the special law of suretyship applied to accommodation signatures. However, it
seems plausible that accommodation signers generally understood the risk of signing when
they gave their accommodations. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 236-37; R. KILBOURNE, supra note 56, at 147.
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The quantity of commercial paper demanded would increase
as its cost decreased, ceteris paribus.6 Commercial paper would
be less costly to bona fide holders if they could expect to be free of
the risk of inability to fully enforce surety-type accommodation
paper. This could result in an increase in demand for all legitimate appearing commercial paper. If producers of fraudulent
but facially legitimate accommodation paper could increase their
output, as seems likely, one result of removing this risk from bona
fide holders would be an increase in the quantity of fraudulent
accommodation paper in the market. At the same time, however, allowing full bona fide holder recovery on accommodation
contracts also would increase the costs of producing fraudulent
paper 4 All accommodation paper signers, including defrauders,
would have to be concerned with the possibility of being legally
required to honor their contracts if the paper was ultimately negotiated to a bona fide holder.6 Thus, the effects of a rule treating surety-type accommodation paper like any other commercial
paper would have been countervailing and it is not obvious
which would have predominated.
On the other hand, a rule impairing bona fide holder recovery on surety-type accommodation paper by allowing accommodation parties to raise the defense of lack of consideration against
bona fide holders would have made commercial paper a more
risky medium of exchange by decreasing the reliability of its information content." This could decrease the demand for all commercial paper, although given the general antebellum money
shortage it is highly likely that commercial paper would still have
been employed as an exchange medium. But transferees would
have diverted additional resources from other uses in order to reduce their risks and discounts would have increased in size.6

6 See generallyJ. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 11, at chs. 2, 4.
64 See generallyid. atch. 14.
6 See Bank of Montgomery County v. Walker, 9 Serg. & Rtawle at 239-40.
6 See generallyR. MCKENZIE & G. TULLOCK, THE NEW WORLD OF ECONOMICS 15153 (3d ed. 1981). The paper's information content would be even more diminished if the
rule made accommodation paper completely nonnegotiable so that any obligor could as-

sert defenses.
67 See notes 35-37 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the means
available for transferees to reduce their risks.
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Thus, a rule impairing bona fide holder recovery on accommodation paper may have been perverse from an efficiency point of
view.
While the existence of actual illegality or tortious conduct in
cases involving accommodation paper, broadly defined, was
often doubtful, antebellum judges frequently encountered cases
in which commercial paper had most certainly been the subject
of theft, fraud, unauthorized alteration, or forgery. Keeping in
mind the preceding discussion,. the following observations suggest some issues which might be addressed in an economic analysis of the rules applied to these more concrete forms of wrongdoing."'
Consider commercial paper stolen from the maker's possession immediately after it was signed by the maker or paper issued
by the maker in reliance upon fraudulent representations by the
payee. Each situation presents something less than a voluntary
market transaction which can be presumed to reallocate resources to a more valuable use. 69 Theft involves a coerced wealth
transfer which is the antithesis of efficient exchange. Theft of a
promise to pay $100 in one month, if legally enforceable, is much
like the theft of $100 in cash. 70 Issuance of the note in the fraud
situation may seem voluntary in that the maker signed and delivered of his own free will, but there was market failure resulting
71
from disinformation introduced by the payee.
The lack of a voluntary exchange in each case might provide
an efficiency-based rationale for permitting the maker to recover
his instrument, even from a bona fide holder. But there would
have been a voluntary exchange between the bona fide holder
and his immediate transferor. The requirements for bona fide
holder status seem to have been designed to insure that it was obtained only by holders who acquired commercial paper in transactions that were voluntary, value maximizing, and entered into
with an honest expectation of obtaining good title. Thus, the effi68 See also Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J.
LEG. STUD. 569 (1980).
69 See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at § § 4.6-4.7.
70 The present value of the note would be less than $100 because of the types of risks
discussed in this article and the contractually specified delay in obtaining payment.
71 See B. POSNER, supra note 6, at § § 4.6-.7.
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ciency of voluntary exchange supports the title claims of both the
maker of the note and the bona fide holder. Absent an agreement
directly between these persons, there is no way to be certain that
the former would obtain more utility by being relieved of his promise through return of the note than would the latter by being
permitted to enforce or negotiate its obligations 27
It is important to observe that many courts required that an
instrument be voluntarily "delivered" before it would bind the
obligor.7 3 (The stolen note in the example would not have been
delivered by the maker.) This requirement created a property
right not only in the paper and ink composing the physical note
but also, more importantly, in the signer's contractual integrity. 74
The requirement that a person's genuine signature be placed on
commercial paper before he became legally bound thereon
served the same function of preserving freedom from nonconsen72 See id. at § 1.2. This discussion assumes that a person with a defective title can be

a bona fide holder. It became improper at some point, perhaps after enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law promulgated in 1896, to refer to one who took a forged
indorsement as "holder." See W. BarON, supra note 10, at §§ 3, 158. Such a transferee
could not be a bona fide holder even if he met all other requirements for this status.
73 See 1. J. DANIEL, supranote 44, at § 63.
74 As one court observed:
The wrongful act of a thief or a trespasser may deprive the holder of his
property in a note which has once become a note, or property, by delivery,
and may transfer the title to an innocent purchaser for value. But a note in
the hands of the maker before delivery is not property, nor the subject of
ownership, as such; it is, in law, but a blank piece of paper. Can the theft or
wrongful seizure of this paper create a valid contract on the part of the
maker againsthis will, where none existed before? There is no principle of
the law of contracts upon which this can be done, unless the facts of the case
are such that, in justice and fairness, as between the maker and the innocent
holder, the maker ought to be estopped to deny the making and delivery of
the note....
We do not assert that the general rule we are discussing-that "where
one of two innocent parties must suffer," etc.-must be confined exclusively
to cases where a confidence has been placed in some other person (in reference to delivery) and abused. There may be cases where the culpable negligence or recklessness of the maker in allowing an undelivered note to get into
circulation, might justly estop him from setting up non-delivery; as if he
were knowingly to throw it into the street, or otherwise leave it accessible to
the public, with no person present to guard against its abduction under circumstances when he might reasonably apprehend that it would be likely to
be taken.
Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415,432-35 (1870) (emphasis in original).
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sual "contract" obligations.75 ,
Like the defense risk discussed earlier, obligors and bona fide
holders could reduce the risks relating to commercial paper that
was taken from obligors through theft, fraud, and other forms of
wrongdoing by taking preventive measures or through insurance.
Identification of the more efficient class in this regard would
help to determine whether a decision rule protecting the members of one class was more appropriate than a rule protecting the
other. It is noteworthy that as the law of commercial paper developed, the failure to observe precautions with respect to the
custody, execution, completion, or delivery of commercial paper
became an important factor in cases deciding whether bona fide
holders took free of the defenses or title claims of makers or other
obligors. 76 This standard affected the level of risk prevention and
insurance optimal for makers and other obligors and could im77
pede the use of commercial paper if set too high.
Future analysis of the efficiency of legal doctrine used to resolve disputes between obligors and bona fide holders of commercial paper which was the subject of criminal or tortious
wrongdoing would also have to consider a particular rule's effect
on the supply of and demand for such paper and on the level of
wrongdoing-related diseconomies. 78 There is evidence that some
courts were concerned with the impact of negotiability on crime.
For example, it was suggested that the bona fide holder of an instrument bearing a forged indorsement should not be protected
by a negotiability rule because he (rather than the obligor) was in
the best position to pursue the forger. 79 In terms of economic
theory, the possibility of a successful pursuit and punishment
75 See 2 J. DANMIEL, supranote 44, at § 1351.
76 See generally Britton, Negligence in the Law of Bills and Notes, 24 COLUM. L.
REv. 695 (1924). Compare the problem of defining an appropriate standard of care for
bona fide holders, discussed at notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
77 One might draw an interesting comparison between the resulting pattern of commercial paper rules and tort liability rules. See generally Brown, Toward an Economic
Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 323 (1973).
78 See note 55 supra and the accompanying text concerning diseconomies resulting
from wrongdoing.
79 Whether the forgery victim or bona fide holder had been the more negligent actor
was also considered. See generally Kessler, ForgedIndorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863, 86668,871-72 (1938).
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would have imposed a risk-cost on the production of forged
paper.A0
CONCLUSION:
EFFICIENCY VERSUS WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION VERSUS ...

The historical examination' of antebellum commercial law is
in its infancy. Perhaps one of Professor Horwitz' most important
contributions to this endeavor is the interest which he has generated in the field, an interest largely resulting from his challenge
to the "generally shared assumption that 'modernization' is an
unqualified good and that the development of legal doctrines to
reflect the triumph of a market system was both inevitable and
desirable."'" Debate has been heightened by his contention that
"'commercial uniformity' and 'legal certainty and predictability'
are often uncritically put forth as explanations of the rise of commercial law, without the slightest understanding that each of
these disembodied constructs conceals a whole set of political and
economic values which were, in fact, resisted from the beginning
of the century."82 This conclusion offers some observations concerning how the inquiry stimulated by Horwitz might be advanced and suggests how existing research provides an important
counterpoint to the themes he developed in his discussion of "the
rise of negotiability."3
Among other things, this article suggests how persons whose
livelihoods were directly or indirectly dependent on commercial
or financial activity could have been benefited by negotiable

80 Transferors of forged paper also bore the costs of potential warranty or indorse-

ment liability to transferees. See id. at 872-75.

81 M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 211-12. The publication of Horwitz' work stim-

ulated an outpouring of comment and review, most of which has been directed at portions
of his book dealing with subject matter other than the negotiability of commercial paper.
See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Cm. L. REv.
533 (1979).
82 M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 212.

83 Id. at 212-26. Horwitz argues that promissory notes were not as well known as
bills of exchange at the beginning of the antebellum period and that it is doubtful whether
notes, as opposed to bills, were considered negotiable at this time. See id. at 214-15, nn. 612. Whether or not this is accurate, Horwitz is certainly correct that negotiability doctrine
applicable to both bills and notes continued to evolve during 1780-1860.
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commercial paper in its role as a money substitute.84 Professor
Horwitz did not deny the benefits provided by these instruments
when he asserted that judicially fashioned commercial law doc-

trines such as negotiability "were primarily meant to protect

those groups that stood to benefit from an expanding market
economy."8 Rather, his concern lies with those groups in society
that did not stand to benefit from expansion and those "opposed
to the expanding values of a market economy."8"
One difficulty in coming to grips with these concerns in Professor Horwitz' discussion of negotiability lies in the vaguely defined composition of these two groups of nonbeneficiaries which
were not necessarily identical. The former group might contain
persons who were unable to enter the market place. Of the latter
group we are told little more than it possessed "a still dominant
precommercial consciousness of rural and religious America ... *"87 It may have consisted of persons who did not benefit
from market expansion by choice or persons who did benefit but
nonetheless objected philosophically to economic development.
Horwitz' reference to the "commercially unsophisticated '' could
pertain to the members of either group.
Undoubtedly there were Americans who confronted insurmountable barriers excluding them from the benefits of commercial or financial endeavors facilitated by negotiability of commercial paper and who, as a result, fell into Professor Horwitz'

84 The class of direct beneficiaries of negotiability consisted of many subclasses including shipping, agricultural, merchant, and financial interests. See B. KILBouNE,
supra note 56, at 159, 169. Commercial paper litigation, which may have been most frequent during periods of financial stress, frequently involved members of these subclasses.
Id. at 133, 165, 206. In addition to direct beneficiaries, there may have been indirect
beneficiaries such as persons who obtained employment in a growing economy.
85 M. HORWITZ, supranote 3, at 212.
86 Id. at 211.
87 Id. Professor Horwitz also did not elaborate upon what he considered to be a
major policy issue contributing to resistance to negotiability: "ITihecontinuing fear that
through negotiability of notes legislatures would lose control over the money supply." Id.
at 213, 218. It is unclear whether this fear was grounded in concern over erosion of legislative power, inflationary increases in the general price level, or the wealth transfers theoretically obtainable by a private money issuer through unanticipated inflation. Concerning the latter two possibilities, see generally Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, VerticalIntegration,Appropriate Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 11 J. LAW & ECON.
297,324 (1978).
88 M. HoRwITz, supranote 3, at 219.
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first group. These persons may have been handicapped by economic ignorance, geographic separation from any market place
in which commercial paper was employed, wealth endowments
that were insufficient to stake entry, or in other ways. There is
also evidence, however, that commercial paper was utilized by
Americans with limited financial resources and expertise no more
substantial than that required to utilize a modem checking account.A9 Moreover, antebellum conditions were such that persons
who were unsuccessful in commercial or financial endeavors
might discreetly disappear only to try again at some future
time.10 Persons who lacked a credit reputation sufficiently sound
to permit them to negotiate their commercial paper to banks
could obtain discounts from note brokers. 91 Thus, one can plausibly argue that under antebellum circumstances negotiability
doctrine helped to lower entrance barriers by reducing the riskiness of instruments executed by debtors who lacked a reputation
92
for credit worthiness.
The possibility that relatively unsophisticated individuals
might become involved in commercial paper usage suggests an
explanation for any increase in judicial acceptance enjoyed by
negotiability from 1780 to 1860 which, unlike Professor Horwitz'
explanation, is not dependent on the existence of pro-commercial
treatise writers and federal judges bent on advancing the interests of merchants and entrepreneurs. This explanation would
recognize that novices might not have understood that by executing an instrument they were, in effect, agreeing to not assert defenses or claims against bona fide holders. A legal environment in
which the state of negotiability doctrine was uncertain would
have reinforced this naivete. Antebellum courts might have become more willing to adopt or expand protection for bona fide
holders as the risks involved in signing commercial paper became
more broadly understood. 93

89 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 236, 468; A. GREEF, supra note 17, at 1-37;
Freyer, supranote 54, (in print).
90 See T. FREYER, supranote 22, at 9, 57.
91 See A. GREEF, supra note 17, at 1-37.
92 See note 37 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the advantages
credit information would give to a potential creditor.
9 See generally Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HoFSrm L. REv. 487 (1980).
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It should be observed here that twentieth century commercial paper developments suggest a drawing back from commercial paper negotiability. 4 Courts and legislatures gradually began to disallow financers' claims to the rights of a holder in due
course (the twentieth century's equivalent to a bona fide holder)
on promissory notes executed by consumers. 5 One reason that
consumers were permitted to assert defenses against remote
holders was that they had not understood or bargained for the
possibility of their loss.96 Language from judicial opinions quoted
by Professor Horwitz seems to suggest that nineteenth century
courts were also concerned with whether parties signatory to
commercial paper had fully understood the consequences of affixing their names to the instrument.97
There undoubtedly also were Americans who fell into Professor Horwitz' second group of persons whose precommercial and
religious consciousness was offended by economic development.",
However, disputes which ultimately focused on some aspect of
negotiability were seldom if ever skirmishes between this group
and "aggressive business interests." 99 Nor were these disputes
necessarily resolved on the basis of pro- or anti-commercial judicial bias. For example, one can postulate that sectional rivalry
was influential in shaping developments relating to negotiabil-

94 Professor Gilmore has suggested that currency reforms and modem uses of bank
credit had begun to make commercial paper obsolete as a money substitute by the midnineteenth century. Gilmore, The Good FaithPurchaseIdea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 613 (1981). However, courts still recognize that some types of commercial paper function like money. See
Ashford v. Thomas Cook & Son, 471 P.2d 530 (Hawaii 1970).
95 See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1972). See generally Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORINELL L. REv. 503
(1975). Holder in due course protection on consumer notes was substantially abolished in
1975 by the Federal Trade Commission. 16 CFR § 433.1-.2 (1979).
96 Economic analysis demonstrates how an inefficient allocation of resources can result from a debtor's failure to perceive the risk of lost defenses when deciding whether to
execute a note. See note 32 supra.
97 See M. HoRWInz, supra note 3, at 217.
98 Perhaps they disliked "speculation" involving commercial paper. See A. GREEF,
supra note 17, at 13-26 for a discussion of the speculative nature of the antebellum commercial paper business.
99 M. HORwiTZ, supra note 3, at 211. See Freyer, supra note 54; note 84 supra for
discussions of the identities of the combatants in antebellum commercial paper litigation.
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ity.'10 Courts may not have favored debtors or creditors, farmers
or businessmen, but were instead interested in protecting the
members of these classes within their jurisdictions against outsiders.
Furthermore, precedential constraints may have had more to
do with the final result of some negotiability-related litigation
than any form of judicial bias. As one example, the outcome of
cases considering the issue of whether bona fide holder status
could be obtained by persons who acquired negotiable instruments as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing indebtedness may have been substantially influenced by a doctrinal need
to find payment of a present consideration by the holder.' 01
Finally, at least one postbellum development in the law of
negotiable instruments does not seem consistent with Professor
Horwitz' conclusion that by around 1850 "[1]aw, once conceived
of as protective, regulative, paternalistic, and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had come
to be thought of as facilitative of individual desires and as simply
reflective of the existing organization of economic and political
power."1 02 After 1869 many American courts began to protect
persons who signed negotiable instruments in reliance upon misrepresentations concerning the character of the instrument.103 A
common case was that in which the signer had been led to believe that he was executing an agreement authorizing him to sell
some manufactured product on commission. Persons who may
have been incapable of judging their self interest, such as the
aged, sick, and illiterate, were often the victims of this type of
10

See T.

FREYER,

supra note 22, at 11, 13, 15, 22-23, 28-29. See also A.

supranote 17, at 18. But see R. KILBOtRNE, supra note 56, at 206.

GREEF,

101 See Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns 637 (N.Y. 1822). See generally 1 J. DANIEL,
supranote 73, at §§ 820-32.
102 M. HoRwiTz, supra note 3, at 253. Professor Horwitz also argues that the formalism characteristic of postbellum judicial opinions was designed to consolidate the legal
gains achieved by groups possessing economic and political power. Id. at 253-66. This argument is challenged by Professor Gilmore, who concludes that, but for legislative intervention, "the law of negotiable instruments would in all probability have, by the early
because the
part of this century, . . . become a sort of ghostly echo from the past ....
money substitute role of commercial paper became less important. Gilmore, supra note
49, at 456.
103 See generallyBritton, Fraudin the Inception of Bills andNotes, 9 CORNELL L.Q.
138 (1923-24).
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fraud and, correspondingly, the beneficiaries of this judicial limitation on the protection afforded bona fide holders. 10 4

104

Id. at 141-42.

